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Much has been written about the free energy principle (FEP), and
much misunderstood. The principle has traditionally been put forth as a
theory of brain function or biological self-organisation. Critiques of the
framework have focused on its lack of empirical support and a failure to
generate concrete, falsifiable predictions. I take both positive and negative
evaluations of the FEP thus far to have been largely in error, and appeal
to a robust literature on scientific modelling to rectify the situation. A
prominent account of scientific modelling distinguishes between model
structure and model construal. I propose that the FEP be reserved to
designate a model structure, to which philosophers and scientists add
various construals, leading to a plethora of models based on the formal
structure of the FEP. An entailment of this position is that demands
placed on the FEP that it be falsifiable or that it conform to some degree
of biological realism rest on a category error. To this end, I deliver first an
account of the phenomenon of model transfer and the breakdown between
model structure and model construal. In the second section, I offer an
overview of the formal elements of the framework, tracing their history of
model transfer and illustrating how the formalism comes apart from any
interpretation thereof. Next, I evaluate existing comprehensive critical
assessments of the FEP, and hypothesise as to potential sources of existing
confusions in the literature. In the final section, I distinguish between
what I hold to be the FEP—taken to be a modelling language or modelling
framework—and what I term “FEP models.”
1 Introduction
The questions most frequently—and most fervently—asked about the FEP are:
Is it true? What is it true of? How do we know (empirically) that it is true?
These questions, I argue, rest on a category mistake. They presume that the
FEP is the sort of thing that makes assertions about how things are, cuts at
natural joints, and can be empirically verified or falsified. I urge that before we
can make serious headway on understanding the FEP and putting it to work
in scientific practice, we must answer to an entirely different set of questions:
What sort of scientific object is the FEP? To what discipline(s) does the FEP
belong? What role is it intended to play in relation to empirical research? Does
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the FEP even properly belong to the domain of science? The extant litera-
ture has largely begged, dodged, dismissed, and skirted around these questions,
without ever addressing them head-on. To the extent that existing works have
attempted to address these questions, all have proceeded under the—mistaken,
or so I will argue—assumption that the FEP is, itself, fundamentally truth-apt.
These questions must, I urge, be answered satisfactorily before we can make
any headway on the theoretical consequences of the FEP. Empirical work with
the FEP has proceeded in the absence of such a clarificatory project, but it
has not been unencumbered by it. I take preliminary steps towards answering
these questions in this paper, first by examining the historical path traversed
by key formal elements of the framework and the implications they hold for
its utility, and second, by offering a route to interpreting the FEP, and models
built therefrom, in light of an abundant philosophical literature on scientific
modelling.
Existing literature on the FEP invokes “the free energy principle” to refer in-
discriminately to both the raw formal structure of the framework and to various
models constructed therefrom. My novel proposal is that we reserve the term
“free energy principle” to designate the model structure, which can be differen-
tiated from distinct models composed from the combination of that structure
with a scientist’s or theorist’s construal thereof. To this end, I first deliver an
account of what is known as model transfer, which illustrates a phenomenon
undergone by the FEP and helps us to see how models can be broken down to
a structure and a construal. I also broach the topic of conceptual reification in
modelling. Next, I trace out the history of the core formal elements of the FEP,
illustrating the formal skeleton of the FEP, sans interpretation. In section three,
I tackle the claims made in existing critical assessments of the FEP, elucidating
where these have gone wrong in their interpretation of the framework. From
there, I look to the literature on scientific modelling once again, drawing conclu-
sions about how to wield and interpret the various scientific models built from
this formal foundation. My hope is that this text can serve as a fruitful starting
place for philosophers and scientists looking to utilise the FEP formalism.
2 Model Transfer, Structure & Construal
This section introduces the notions of model transfer, model structure, model
construal, and model reification, which will enable us to better understand the
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FEP, along with its uses and misuses. According to several popular accounts
of scientific modelling, a scientific model is composed of a structure and an
interpretation. This breakdown is most applicable to abstract, formal models.
It is perhaps easiest to see this distinction play out in cases where a model
structure, originally designed for one modelling purpose, is exapted away from
its original interpretation and lent a new one.
2.1 The Lotka-Volterra Model
Take the Lotka-Volterra model. The structure, in this case, is a system of
nonlinear differential equations. The Lotka-Volterra model originated in physics
and chemistry. The equations were originally proposed by Alfred Lotka in 1910
as a model of autocatalysis—self-catalysing chemical sets. They describe the
rate of change of chemical concentrations as a chemical system pushed out of
equilibrium restores itself, by oscillations, back to steady state. A linearisation
of the model produces a system similar to a harmonic oscillator.
A paradoxical trend was noted in fish populations of the Adriatic Sea sur-
rounding World War I. Italian biologist Umberto d’Ancona measured the rel-
ative prevalence of fish of various species. He found that, during WWI, when
fishing in the Adriatic Sea all but ceased, the predator population experienced a
boom. In response, the prey populations diminished considerably. When fishing
resumed after the war—an indiscriminate biocide—the prey population soared.
Vito Volterra (1926) employed a system of nonlinear differential equations for-
mally equivalent to Lotka’s (1910) chemical model to explain how the removal
of a constraint (fishing) increased the amplitude of predator population size,
while the reimposition of this constraint—the return of fishing after the war—
increased the amplitude of the prey populations. In 1956, Lotka independently
proposed the same set of equations for the purpose of explaining predator-prey
dynamics in his Elements of Mathematical Biology.
How does this exemplar help us to understand the free energy principle?
In two ways. First, it is common for a relatively coarse-grained formal model
initially utilised in one domain (in this case, physical chemistry) to be later im-
ported into an altogether different discipline (in this case, population biology,
ecology, and ethology). Second, the case renders intuitive the distinction be-
tween the structure and the construal of a model. The structure—a system of
differential equations—remains the same for both the (1910) model of catalytic
sets and the (1926, 1956) models of predator-prey dynamics. The two models
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differ in that, in the first instance, scientists interpret the equations to represent
chemical concentrations, while in the second instance, scientists interpret the
equations to represent population density.
Conceptual reification is a common ailment of scientific modelling. It is
particularly likely to occur in cases in which models have somewhat convoluted
histories. Reification involves mistaking an aspect of a model—its structure, its
construal, or the union of both—for an aspect of empirical data or the natural
world; mistaking the math for the territory, so to speak. Reification also occurs
when we take an analogical relationship to be a literal one, or when elements
of a model’s construal in its original domain of application get brought along
parasitically into a novel domain in model transfer.
In the next section, we will examine the historical trajectory undertaken
by several of the key formal elements of the framework; its legacy of model
transfer. This historical exercise allows us to clearly separate the formalism
from its interpretations in various domains and lends us insight into some of the
reification that has led to confusions surrounding the FEP.
3 The Free Energy Principle
3.1 History of the Formalism
To understand the FEP, separated from the various construals attached to it in
its various contemporary instantiations for theoretical or simulation purposes,
and separated from various construals which may have attached themselves
parasitically to the framework during its elaborate history of model transfer, it
will be necessary to trace out this historical record. Many of the formal tricks
embodied in the FEP originated in physics, some in machine learning, some in
physics via machine learning. The FEP, however, is not a law of physics, nor
is it a theory, model, or principle belonging to the physical domain. It is not a
machine learning technology, though it draws upon some of the same underlying
statistical techniques.
A relevant contingent of people concerned with the FEP take it to be, in
one way or another, a physical description of natural systems. This has an
obvious form: taking notions such as energy, entropy, dissipation, equilibrium,
heat, or steady state, which play important roles in the FEP, in their senses as
originally developed in physics. There is a more subtle form of this tendency,
however, in which people begin with the assumption of an analogical relationship
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to physics, or a mere formal equivalence, but conclude that the formalism of the
FEP nonetheless picks out real and measurable properties of natural systems,
albeit perhaps more loosely and abstractly than its physical equivalents would.
This, I argue, is a conceptual reification; a vestigial interpretation from the
formal methods’ origin in statistical physics.
3.1.1 The Epistemic Turn in Statistical Mechanics
An important precursor to the FEP that seldom comes up in the literature is
Jaynes’ maximum entropy principle.1 The classical interpretation of statistical
mechanics views the macroscopic variables of some physical system of interest—
say, heat, volume, and pressure—as physical constraints on the microscopic be-
haviour of the system. This is a decidedly physical interpretation of the maths.
Jaynes (1957) critical insight was that we could give this all a subjectivist, epis-
temological reading, casting these macroscopic variables as knowledge about
the system, with the lower-order details to be inferred. The principle of maxi-
mum entropy guarantees the maximum (information) entropy of a probability
distribution given known variables. Maximising the entropy of the distribution
guarantees that we are not building in any more assumptions than we have evi-
dence for. This principle of maximum entropy took the formalism of statistical
mechanics and gave it an information-theoretic interpretation, turning the sec-
ond law of thermodynamics into a sort of Occam’s razor for Bayesian inference.
This is because the maximum entropy principle brings us to adopt the probabil-
ity density with the most widely dispersed probability density function, given
the known variables, just as entropy will be maximised with respect to macro-
scopic variables in statistical mechanics. These are formally identical. Given
the frequency with which the literature on the FEP makes reference to Jaynes,
one might think it a rather inconsequential piece of the puzzle. In order to un-
derstand the FEP, however—and why it is closer to a statistical technique than
it is to a falsifiable theory of biological self-organisation—it is important to see
that there is a clear precedent for leveraging the maths of statistical mechanics
as a method for Bayesian inference. Jaynes’ maximum entropy principle (often
referred to as MaxEnt) has had tremendous success as a tool for scientific mod-
eling across the sciences. The free energy principle, much like the maximum
entropy principle, takes the mathematical machinery of statistical mechanics
1 For a thorough overview of the FEP/MaxEnt connection, refer to Gottwald & Braun,
2020.
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and lends the formal tools therein a distinctly epistemic, inferentialist bent.
3.1.2 The Mean Field Approximation
Independently, an approach known as mean field theory emerged in statistical
mechanics at the beginning of the twentieth century that enabled physicists to
study high-dimensional, stochastic systems by means of an idealised model of
the system that would average out, rather than summing over, the interactions
of elements within the system. Feynman (1972) introduced what are known as
variational methods within the path-integral formulation of mean field theory.
By exploitation of the Gibbs-Bogoliubov-Feynman inequality, one is able to
achieve a highly accurate approximation of the energetics of a target system
under a range of conditions. This is accomplished via minimisation of free energy
by variations on a simplified candidate Hamiltonian to bring it into accord with
the true Hamiltonian.2 What is important to understand about Feynman’s
original formulation of the free energy minimisation technique is that it is 1.
not to be taken as a literal representation of a target system but rather it is
a formal trick for approximating otherwise intractable computational problems
that arise in dealing with certain physical systems, and 2. that the free energy
involved nonetheless refers to a physical quantity: Helmholtz free energy.
3.1.3 Free Energy in Machine Learning
The method of variational free energy minimisation was adapted for statistics
and machine learning towards the end of the twentieth century as ensemble
learning or learning with noisy weights (Hinton & van Camp, 1993; Hinton &
Zemel, 1993; MacKay, 2001). Thus free energy minimisation in statistics is a
variational method for approximate inference where intractable integrals are in-
volved. A quantity, termed variational free energy, is minimised, thus bringing
the ensemble density or variational density—the approximate posterior proba-
bility density, on a Bayesian interpretation—into approximate conformity with
the true target density (Friston, Mattout, Trujillo-Barreto, Ashburner, & Penny,
2006; Hinton & van Camp, 1993; MacKay 1995a, 1995b, 1995c; Neal & Hin-
ton, 1998). According to Friston, this method of approximating the posterior
density or ensemble density is a statistical analogue of the mean field approx-
imation in statistical physics (Friston et al., 2006). We can see that both the
2 We may think of the Hamiltonian of a physical system as the net kinetic and potential
energies of all of the particles in the system.
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free energy term and the construct it is being leveraged to approximate refer
to energetic properties of the physical systems under study—Helmholtz free en-
ergy, and the system’s Hamiltonian—as the method was originally purposed
by Feynman (1972). The variational free energy and the variational or pos-
terior probability density involved in the variational free energy minimisation
technique as employed by Hinton and van Camp (1993), however, are purely
statistical constructs. Thus, although it may be tempting to lend the “free
energy” under the FEP a physical interpretation, it is not meant to invoke a
physical quantity. Variational free energy is not Helmholtz free energy, despite
the formal similarity.
3.1.4 Variational Bayes
The finer points of the formulation of variational Bayes in use today were worked
out by Beal (2003) and Attias (2000). Beal (2003) illustrates how conceiving
of approximate Bayesian inference in terms of conditional probabilities can be
facilitated via graphical models, such as Markov random networks, highlighting
the import of the set of nodes that form the Markov blanket of the set of inter-
est. An exact deployment of Bayes’ theorem almost always leads to intractable
integrals—the sort of calculus it would take an adept mathematician years to
solve. By contrast, approximate variational Bayesian methods generate candi-
date probability distributions and assess the Kullback-Leibler (K-L) divergence
between candidate and target distributions.
3.1.5 Innovations in Friston’s Free Energy Minimisation
Karl Friston took the method of variational free energy minimisation and gave it
a dynamical-systems interpretation, specifying the free energy minimisation dy-
namic in terms of the Fokker-Planck equation and, in particular, the solenoidal
and irrotational flows that fall out of the Helmholtz decomposition thereof, of
which the irrotational flow can be conceptualised as a gradient-ascent on an at-
tracting set (Friston, 2009, 2010, 2012, 2019; Friston & Stephan, 2007; Friston,
Trujillo-Barreto, & Daunizeau, 2008). This allows us to think of free energy
minimisation simultaneously as a method of approximate Bayesian inference
and as a flow.3
3 Friston notes that it is interesting that the formulation of free energy minimisation using
gradient flows (a.k.a., gradient descent) was an important practical development in the data
analysis tools commonly applied in neuroscience—for example, in dynamic causal modelling.
In brief, this freed one from the analytic derivations of vanilla variational Bayes and the use
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Jaynes’ maximum entropy principle took the formalism of statistical mechan-
ics and leveraged it to accommodate our own process of inference given limited
and noisy data. Friston’s FEP goes a step further, borrowing mathematical
tools from the physical sciences in order to treat scientists making inferences
about the inferential dynamics of systems in nature.
3.2 Fundamentals of the FEP
The Fokker-Planck, or Kolmogorov Forward equation describes the time evolu-
tion of a probability density function. The Fokker-Planck equation originated
in statistical mechanics, in which it described the evolution of the probability
density function of the velocity of some particle, or its position, in which case
it was known as the Smoluchowski equation. In the context of the FEP, the
Fokker-Planck equation describes the evolution of the probability density func-
tion of the state of a system. As such it can be thought of as a trajectory
through one abstract state space which is a probabilistic representation of some
lower-order abstract state space representing what state a given system is in
over some definite time window. Any vector field that satisfies the appropriate
conditions for smoothness and decay can be broken down into solenoidal (curl)
and irrotational (divergence) components. This is known as the Helmholtz de-
composition; the fact that we can perform the Helmholtz decomposition is then
known as the fundamental theorem of vector calculus.
The static solution to the Fokker-Planck equation is a probability density
termed the Nonequilibrium Steady State density, or NESS density (Friston,
2019; Friston and Ao, 2012). The notion of nonequilibrium steady state is na-
tive to statistical mechanics, wherein it describes a particular energetic dynamic
between a system and its surrounding heatbath. NESS is best understood as
the breaking of detailed balance. Detailed balance is a condition in which the
temporal evolution of any variable is the same forwards as it is backwards (the
system’s dynamics are fully time-reversible). Detailed balance holds only at
thermodynamic equilibrium. In nonequilibrium steady state, balance holds in
that none of the variables that define the system will undergo change on average
over time, but there is entropy production, and there are flows in and out of the
system. Jiang, Qian, and Qian (2004) and Zhang, Qian, and Qian (2012) have
demonstrated that nonequilibrium steady state can be represented as a station-
of conjugate priors; enabling a generic variational scheme for modelling empirical data known
as variational Laplace.
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ary, irreversible Markov process. This development paved the way towards a
purely statistical rendering of the notion of NESS.
The literature on the FEP also rests centrally on the notion of a Markov
blanket (Kirchhoff, Parr, Palacios, Friston, & Kiverstein, 2018), an adaptation
of Pearl’s (1988) Markov boundary. A Markov blanket essentially partitions
the world into a thing which can be conceived of as, in its very existence and
dynamics, performing a kind of inference, and a thing it is inferring—on a yet
more basic level, the Markov blanket allows us to partition the world into a
system of interest, and all that lies outside of that system of interest. Systems
are represented under the FEP as being subject to random fluctuations, which
are responsible for the stochasticity of the systems involved. These fluctuations
would result in the dissolution of the systems of interest, were it not for some
balancing flow. In the absence of a counteracting flow, the system, as defined by
its Markov blanket, would cease to exist as such. If the set of states considered
to be the system (internal states and their Markov blanket) are to resist this
dissipative tendency, they must counteract it. This counteracting flow can be
conceptualised in a number of ways. For one, we can think of the perturbations
as causing the NESS density to disperse, and the irrotational flow under the
Fokker-Planck equation as countering these fluctuations. We can also think of
it as ascending the gradients induced by the logarithm of the NESS density.
The system is hillclimbing on a landscape of probability. It seeks to ascend
peaks of maximum likelihood and escape from improbable valleys. In fact, the
FEP is a form of dynamic expectation maximisation, which is itself a maximum
likelihood function (Friston, Trujillo-Barreto, & Daunizeau, 2008). The flow of
the system must also, moment by moment, minimise surprisal or self-information
by gradient descent. Variational free energy constrains this activity by placing
an upper bound on surprisal.
Under the FEP, a system of interest can be represented as being subject
to random perturbations, which would induce dissipation were it not for some
flow countering this dissipation. The Fokker-Planck equation encapsulates these
random perturbations as w—the Wiener process, or Brownian motion. The
curl-free (irrotational) dimension of the flow described by the Fokker-Planck
under the Helmholtz decomposition will be seen to counter this flux, maintaining
the integrity of the NESS density, which places high probability mass over the
system’s pullback, or random global attractor (Friston, 2019). All this means is
that, statistically speaking, the system prefers this region of its phase space—
the way a cat likes a laptop computer or a ball likes to roll downhill. The NESS
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density can also be cast as a generative model, as the highest probability region
of the system’s phase space will be a joint distribution over all of the system’s
variables. By generative model, we mean here a joint probability distribution
over external and blanket states. For this reason, we can conceptualise the
behaviours of the systems treated under the FEP as statistical models of the
causes impinging upon them from their environments. This follows from the
complete class theorem which, in its Bayesian, statistical generalisation, states
that any decision procedure operating according to a loss or risk function in a
finite sample space is, under certain assumptions, Bayes optimal with respect
to some prior. By extension, then, any dynamical system that minimises some
loss or risk function according to some decision procedure is taken to be Bayes
optimal under some generative model and priors.
This brings us back to the inferential interpretation of the dynamic described
by the FEP. When we apply Bayes theorem to a problem of inference or be-
lief updating, we want to maximise marginal likelihood. Marginal likelihood is
the likelihood of some observation given our model; it is also termed Bayesian
model evidence, or simply evidence. Surprise and evidence are inverse functions.
When we minimise surprisal, we are maximising model evidence. Thus, systems
under the FEP are said to be ‘self-evidencing’ (Hohwy, 2016). Over time and
on average, the minimisation of surprisal minimises information entropy. This
effectively prevents a system’s states from dispersing in a statistical sense—
it keeps the values of certain key variables within certain existential (that is,
definitive of the system) bounds. In minimising (an upper bound on) surprisal,
we minimise (a lower bound on) model or marginal evidence, or simply evi-
dence. This makes free energy minimisation equivalent to evidence lower bound
optimisation (ELBO), an objective function that anyone with a background in
machine learning or Bayesian statistics will find themselves familiar with.
Here we have traced the history of key formal elements of the FEP in Jaynes,
Feynman, Hinton, Pearl, Beal, and Friston. Having a handle on this history is
necessary in order to grasp the subtle turn away from statistical approximations
of physical properties of physical systems to a pure, substrate-neutral method
of statistical inference. When we speak of annealing a model in statistical me-
chanics, ratcheting the temperature of the system up and down in the hopes of
bumping it out of local minima, this does not refer to an act of literally inject-
ing energy into a physical system to increase the speed of particle motion. It is
a statistical analogue of a physical process. Likewise, the energy and entropy
of the FEP are formal analogues of concepts defined in thermodynamics and
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statistical mechanics with a long history of use in information theory, statis-
tics, and machine learning, in which they have lost their correspondence to any
measurable properties of physical systems.
4 Critical Appraisals
Mine is not the first paper to attempt to get to the bottom of the FEP. There
have been, to date, a number of attempts at comprehensive critical assessment
of the FEP, including Colombo, (2017) Colombo and Wright (2017, 2018), van
Es (2020), Gershman and Daw (2012) Gershman (2019) Klein (2018), and Sims,
(2016). The nominal worries of these critical accounts include that the FEP lacks
biophysical or cognitive realism, that it somehow contravenes experimental ob-
servation, that it is incapable of providing an all-encompassing account of brain
function, or that it fails to make novel predictions (Colombo, 2017; Colombo
& Wright, 2017, 2018; Gershman & Daw, 2012; Gershman, 2019; Klein, 2018).
The real worry, though, the worry that is only made explicit a few beers in to
the spillover of the conference proceedings into some smoke-filled local tavern,
the worry that is only put to words in the manuscripts that get rejected before
they ever make it to print, is that the FEP is somehow empty; that it lacks all
conceptual content. My claim is that the FEP is, indeed, empty in just this
way, that that is not—or ought not to be—a secret, and that its contentlessness
does not count as a mark against the framework.
Indeed, existing works in this genre all stack the solutions they arrive at
against this conclusion. They all appear to beg the question. And this may be,
to some extent, the product of a selection effect. Papers on the line that have
made this most deflationary of claims about the FEP have been tossed back into
the water, so to speak. Such has been the case with the initial incarnation of
Williams (2020), for example. The reason for this somewhat violent rejection is
that these critical accounts, much like the preponderance of positive accounts,
fail to differentiate between the FEP as formal model structure and the various
models built from or atop this structure, which themselves are often casually
referred to as “the FEP” in the literature.
4.1 Colombo & Wright
Colombo and Wright (2018) do entertain the idea that the FEP is merely a
formal modelling tool—indeed, they even diagnose the problem of reification in
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modelling, “the risk of conflating scientific models and their targets” (p. 12)—
but they never take this hypothesis seriously. Colombo and Wright (2018) raise
the matter as a serious question to be addressed: “should we understand FEP
as a modeler’s tool to characterize and predict adaptive behavior, or should it
be understood as an objective feature of target systems?” (Colombo & Wright,
2018, pp. 15-16). As they proceed, however, they merely “assume that the prob-
abilities involved in FEP aren’t simply modelers’ tools” (Colombo & Wright,
2018, p. 17). It is unclear on what grounds they justify this assumption, be-
yond the further (unjustified) assumption that the aim of the modelling exercise
must be realism and that “Friston (2013) seems to interpret the probabilities in-
volved in FEP as objective features of real-world systems” (Colombo & Wright
2018). Ultimately, the hypothesis that the FEP is empirically contentless is
swept aside: “what’s intended cannot be that FEP is unfalsifiable because it
fails to be truth-apt” (Colombo & Wright, 2018, pp. 22-23).
4.2 Gershman, Klein, & Williams
Gershman’s (2019) supposed critique of the framework does not actually coun-
tenance the FEP, but diverst its attention to process models, writing “we will
be concerned with [the FEP’s] credentials as a theory, and therefore we will pay
particular attention to specific implementations (process models)” (Gershman,
2019, p. 2). Sims (2016) likewise conflates the FEP with associated corro-
laries and process theories. For example, he writes: “In its form as a theory
of cognition, the application of this theory to explain mental phenomena draws
heavily upon the notion of expected precision” (Sims, 2016, 970). Expected pre-
cision is a notion proper to predictive coding and various models that fall under
the heading of predictive processing. In a similar vein, Sims writes that the
“free energy principle makes certain non-trivial predictions about brain struc-
ture and function,” listing among these predictions a greater preponderance of
top-down (feedback) connections than bottom-up, feedforward connections, and
the organisation of the cortical hierarchy, likewise the purview of hierarchical
predictive coding or predictive processing models. Klein (2018) argues that the
FEP is either susceptible to the dark room problem or it is something like an
idealised model. On this deflationary depiction of the FEP, it is taken as “a
starting point from which one might develop explanations,” and its success (or
failure) as a scientific tool ultimately rests on “the empirical adequacy of de-
tailed models which spring from it” (Klein, 2018, p. 2554). This, I think, is
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precisely the right mode of understanding FEP-based models. Thus, models
built from the formal architecture of the FEP offer “a deliberate simplification,
which buys scientific fruitfulness at the cost of literal truth” (Klein, 2018, p.
2554). Notably, this is quite close to a Wimsattian (1987) view of the epistemic
virtues of modelling. Williams (2020) delivers a description of the FEP that is
diametrically opposed to Sims’ (2016) depiction: “the FEP does not advance
a causal hypothesis. Specifically, it provides no information about how self-
organization is causally generated and sustained in the systems that it applies
to” (Williams, 2020, p. 20).
It appears that we have the theoretical equivalent of binocular rivalry when
it comes to depictions of the FEP’s empirical commitments and epistemic status.
How, then, do we resolve this conflicting vision? First, we ought to note that
both Sims (2016) and Williams (2020), like most of their predecessors, take “the
free energy principle” to refer to both the raw formalism and to various models
predicated on that formalism which Friston and colleagues have described over
the years. Additionally, Klein (2018) seemingly takes “the free energy prin-
ciple” to refer to active inference and perceptual active inference, hierarchical
predictive coding, and various predictive processing models, describing all as
one and the same theory of cognition. The deflationary conclusion he reaches,
however, maps onto the role played by various models constructed from the for-
mal framework of the FEP: FEP-based models act as heavily-idealised, generic
or targetless mathematical models. One core function such models serve in rela-
tion to scientific practice is as a stepping stone on the road to more fine-grained
and empirically rich models. Williams (2020), on the other hand, adequately
differentiates the FEP from various associated process models and adjacent the-
ories within the Bayesian brain canon. The conclusions he reaches in regards to
the FEP’s explanatory scope and epistemological status have been rejected by
the FEP community because they fail to cohere to what the literature has, to
date, descriptively used “the FEP” to denote. However, I contend that Williams
(2020) assessments of the FEP are precisely on the mark as an appraisal of what
the FEP ought, normatively, to refer to: namely, the formal structure, absent
any interpretation relating it to a target.
4.3 Van Es
Van Es (2020) is the first to draw clear connections between FEP models and the
literature on scientific modelling. Van Es’s (2020) argument is fairly straightfor-
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ward: 1. FEP models describe organism-environment interactions in terms of
modelling. 2. It is unclear to what extent it is intended that an FEP model mod-
els organisms as though they were, themselves, engaged in a practice of mod-
elling their environments, and the extent to which proponents of FEP models
intend the models posited thereunder to be literal, in the world, and indepen-
dent of scientists’ modelling practice. 3. The existing literature utilising FEP
models to address cognition seems to rest, fundamentally, on a conflation be-
tween the two. 4. Kirchhoff and Robertson (2018) argue that the sense in which
organisms’ dynamics mirror their environments, under FEP models, is not rep-
resentational in nature, but merely covariational. 5. There is consensus in the
literature on scientific modelling that scientific models are representational in
nature. 6. The sole nonrepresentational account of scientific modelling on offer
appeals to social practice of science to ground the representational features of
models. 7. Models as leveraged by organisms, under FEP models, cannot re-
course to the social practice of science to ground the representational features
of their models. 8. Therefore, models posited under FEP models fail to count
as models. 9. We must, then, according to van Es, adopt an instrumentalist
stance on models under the FEP.
Van Es’s argument, however, ignores the lengthy and abundant history
of arguing over whether scientific models must be representational in nature,
and whether their sole epistemic virtue must be their representational status.
Downes’ (2020) survey and introduction to the modeling literature supplies an
overview of the debate between representationalists—those who hold that all
models necessarily represent—and nonrepresentationalists—those who hold that
not all models need necessarily represent. Downes (2011) argues for the posi-
tion that not all scientific models represent. He notes here that the emerging
consensus among philosophers concentrated on scientific modeling is that mod-
els serve a plurality of epistemic purposes for research. The characterisation of
scientific modelling in van Es (2020) thus comes across as quite far-afield from
the state of the literature. Van Es saddles the literature on scientific modelling
with the task of demonstrating that models are, by necessity, representational.
In fact, the scientific modelling literature shows quite the opposite: models need
not represent, and representation is not the chief epistemic virtue of scientific
modelling. Van Es points to Oliveira’s (2018) pragmatist approach to modelling
as the singular example in the literature of a nonrepresentationalist approach to
understanding scientific models. In fact, the modelling literature has undergone
something of a pragmatist turn in the 21st century, and nonrepresentational
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accounts abound.
These are not the most fatal flaws in van Es’ argument, however. By far the
more questionable premise is that the generative models embodied or entailed
by organisms under various FEP models are models in precisely the sense in
which scientific models are models. The assertion that all scientific models are
generative models in the formal, statistical sense would be rejected by scientific
modellers and philosophers of scientific modelling alike. It is clear that scientific
models do not denote statistical models of joint probability distributions. Why,
then, should we assume that the generative modelling stipulated under the FEP
is precisely the same sort of modelling that scientists engage in, and subject to
the same constraints?
While instrumentalism with respect to the mathematical constructs lever-
aged in FEP models is a meritorious position, I do not think it is novel—in fact,
I think it is presumed throughout the literature, and the argumentative route
van Es traverses to arrive at this position is a nonstarter. Van Es contends
that the existing FEP literature erroneously conflates two senses of modelling.
In fact, van Es’ own paper demonstrates a conflation between various senses of
the term. There are, in the first place, models as utilised by scientists to gain
leverage over the natural world. There is a deflationary, statistical notion of a
generative model as a statistical model of a joint probability distribution. Van
Es (2020) seems to run the two together, and further conflates both with an
unarticulated strawman notion of models, under which a brain may be said to
“model” its environment in some cognitivist, representationalist sense. I believe
the culprit here is a lack of fluency with both the philosophical literature on
scientific modelling and the statistical techniques that undergird FEP models.
4.4 A Tentative Diagnosis
Whence such confusion? For one, we have seen the convoluted history of model
transfer the FEP has undergone, with formal elements drawn from a number of
disciplines and passing through multiple interpretations before achieving their
current form and use. For another, it is not often pragmatically necessary
in the practice or research or theorising to specify in painstaking detail what
formal models we are drawing from and in what mixture and quantity. For
another, at the risk of psychologising, when one’s primary mode of relating to the
world is not linguistic, but mathematical, the distinction between “maths” and
“territory” makes little sense. In fact, I believe that a necessary precondition to
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being a good physicist is the loss of this distinction between literal description
of the world and mere formal trick. This creates something of a barrier to
interdisciplinary communication. Physicists or those with physics backgrounds
are often known to say things which, to mathematical modellers in biology,
cognitive science, pure maths, or machine learning often seem to mix metaphors.
I view as symptomatic of this tendency Friston’s overly literal descriptions of
the formalism.
There are many places throughout the literature on the FEP in which the
language used to describe the formalism can easily give rise to the misconception
that the framework is a literal—perhaps physical—description of some measur-
able feature of natural systems, or cuts at natural joints. Ramstead, Badcock,
& Friston (2018), for example, write that “systems are alive if, and only if,
there[sic] active inference entails a generative model” (p.33). Under the per-
spective of the FEP—that is, once we have elected to model biological systems
using the formal tools the FEP provides us—any system we choose to model in
this way will behave as the model dictates it must. Under the FEP, in order
to be a system, certain mathematical assumptions must hold. In particular,
we assume a weakly-mixing random dynamical system, a Markov blanket, and
either ergodicity or (organisation to) nonequilibrium steady state (NESS). If we
take the systems attracting set to be a NESS density, then its existence will
entail a generative model. This is a result of the statistical generalisation of the
complete class theorem. Thus in selecting to model a system under the FEP,
we have presumed its dynamics to entail a generative model. This says nothing,
however, about any empirically-ascertainable properties of living systems.
Both the literature forwarding the FEP and the literature critiquing it suffer
from issues of translation: would-be interpreters of the framework face the bur-
den of translation between linguistic and mathematical descriptions, between
discrepancies in disciplinary standards and terms of art, and the long history of
translation between various applications and interpretations which components
of the mathematical framework itself have undergone. I urge that by unpack-
ing these discrepancies in disciplinary conventions, scrutinising the history of
the formalism, and divorcing it not only from meanings ascribed to it in past
disciplinary settings and applications, but from meanings applied to it in what
I term “FEP models,” operationalisations of the framework, we can come to a
considered understanding of what the FEP is in its own right.
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5 Models & The FEP
5.1 The FEP as Model Structure
I propose here that we reserve “the free energy principle” to denote only the
maths of which the FEP is composed. Models utilising this formalism to study
natural systems bear also an interpretation, lending a means of interpreting the
maths as about systems in nature. The papers that exist on the FEP, however,
nearly all seem to leverage the FEP to address some issue, relating it to a target
system. They are what we might call “FEP models.”
According to Weisberg’s account of models, a model’s structure—whether
mathematical, computational, or physical—does not inherently relate to a target
system in an epistemically fruitful way, e.g., by representing features of that
target system. It is only with the addition of a scientist’s interpretation or
construal that we derive a mapping between a model structure and the world,
and a model is born. Once we have that model in hand, however, it can be
tempting to say that we have knowledge of the natural world. The existence
of models, their features, and the output of modelling work, however, do not
constitute knowledge of nature over and above empirically-observed facts that
we may have plugged into our models at the outset (if they are the type of
models that incorporate measurements). To validate a model or its results and
derive from it knowledge of natural laws, systems, or processes, we must match
its predictions to experimental evidence.
We make a category mistake when we claim that a raw mathematical struc-
ture lends us predictions or places constraints on what can be observed in nature,
and are guilty of reification: “there is no such thing as a solely mathematical
account of a target system” (Nguyen & Frigg, 2017, p.1). Likewise when we
take the existence or qualities of a model to constitute knowledge of the natural
world we make a category error and reify the model.
Models have been proposed utilising the formal structure of the FEP that
take as their targets cortical structure, neuronal organisation (Friston, Fager-
holm, Zarghami, Parr, Hipólito, Magrou, & Razi, 2021), the brain as a whole
(Friston, 2010), organisms acting in an environment (Bruineberg & Rietveld
2014; Bruineberg, Kieverstein, & Rietveld, 2016; Buckley, Kim, McGregor, &
Seth), morphogenesis of multicellular organisms (Kuchling, Levin, Georgiev,
& Friston, 2019; Friston, Levin, Sengupta, & Pezzulo, 2015), and even social
structures and behaviours (Ramstead, Veissière,& Kirmayer, 2016). These have
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been representationalist, FEP models (Kiefer & Hohwy, 2018; 2019), cognitivist
FEP models (Kiefer & Hohwy, 2018; 2019), nonrepresentational, Gibsonian
FEP models (Bruineberg & Rietveld 2014; Bruineberg, Kieverstein, & Rietveld,
2016;), enactivist FEP models (Kirchhoff & Froese, 2017; Ramstead, Kirchhoff,
& Friston, 2019), as well as both dualist (Hobson & Friston, 2014) and materi-
alist (Friston, Wiese, & Hobson, 2020; Kiefer, 2020) FEP models. Each of these
is referred to in the literature as “the free energy principle,” and the ontologies,
epistemologies, and predictions borne of each deemed consequences of “the free
energy principle.”
That one and the same “theory” can lend itself explanations of neuronal,
cellular, and social organisation seems puzzling; that it can lend support for
both neurocentrism and extended cognition even more so. I propose that we can
resolve the source of this error signal by denying, in the first place, that the FEP
is a theory—or even a model. Instead, we ought to use “the FEP” to denote the
model structure: the raw formal framework, sans interpretation. In combination
with the numerous construals that exist in the literature, this structure becomes
“FEP models.” The FEP itself, then, lacks all empirical or conceptual content.
It is an empty formalism. The many models built thereon, however, can be
seen to differ with respect to their content (thus different targets, conflicting
interpretations of the same target). If we continue to take the FEP to refer
to all of the above, then the conclusion we must reach (and that critics of the
framework have reached) is that the FEP must either be vacuous or internally
inconsistent. I say we bite the bullet on vacuousness, but restrict the term to
be used only in reference to the formalism.
To illustrate briefly what I mean here: Ramstead, Badcock, & Friston (2018)
write that: “The FEP is a mathematical formulation that explains, from first
principles, the characteristics of biological systems that are able to resist decay
and persist over time,” (p. 2) and that it “asserts that all biological systems
maintain their integrity by actively reducing the disorder or dispersion” (p. 3).
I wish to urge that claims to the effect that the FEP “explains” or “asserts”
anything are misguided. Rather it is only FEP based models which can assert
or explain and, indeed, relate at all to the world. Compare this to Kiefer (2020)
who more rather more carefully describes his work as a “conjunction of the
free energy principle...and the identity thesis” (p.1). Here I am not making a
prescriptive case that we ought to always and only ever refer to “the FEP” as
the maths in the absence of any interpretation and to the models constructed
therefrom as “FEP models,” though admittedly this might go a long ways in
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clearing up some of the misapprehensions in the literature. Rather it is my
hope that this distinction will equip the casual reader with the conceptual tools
necessary to parse the FEP literature, as notoriously dense and befuddling as
it is.
The “FEP” as it has been addressed in the literature thus far is something of
an impossible figure: A pure formalism, empty of all content. A precise theory
of neuronal signalling and transient ensembles. A tautology. A transcendental
argument. It is both unfalsifiable and yet makes precise predictions about the
physical or physiological systems and dynamics capable of instantiating it. Both
materialist and dualist. Both representational, cognitivist, and neurocentrist
and, at the same time, ecological, enactive, and extended. In this section, I
have argued that the only way around interpreting the FEP as over-committed
to conflicting claims is to distinguish the formal framework from various models
composed therefrom. We ought, then, to think of the FEP as a mathematical
structure alone, free of conceptual content, predictions, or representations of
worldly systems. Models add to a structure an interpretation, or construal,
which lends them a mapping function to worldly systems. Models composed
from the formal structure of the FEP may or may not make predictions, or
place constraints on the varieties of systems capable of realise the dynamics
they specify. This is likely to differ from model to model. Attempting to saddle
the formal architecture of the FEP itself with falsifiable predictions, however, is
simply a category error.
6 Conclusion
A recent and abundant literature concerns itself with the FEP, though its claims
and status are contested. The FEP as it is addressed in this literature—both
for and against—is a mathematical structure applied to the modelling of various
phenomena across the social, cognitive, neuro-, and life sciences. Attempts to
secure the precise nature of the FEP, its utility for scientific practice, just how
it represents systems in its respective domains of application, how precisely it
is bolstered or refuted by existing empirical evidence, what constraints it places
on process theories and lower-order models, have thus far been foiled. I suspect
that this is the case because the questions we have been asking of the framework
make implicit category errors, attempting to saddle it with attributes that fail
to apply to the framework in virtue of the sort of thing that it is. What are
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the FEP’s theoretical commitments? What empirical support does it receive?
There are as many answers to these questions as there are papers on the FEP,
and continuing to ask them of the modelling framework as a whole, without
regard to the distinct forms it assumes, will remain a fruitless undertaking.
In this paper, I have argued the case that the free energy principle be con-
sidered not a theory, a law, a hypothesis, a paradigm, or a model, but a formal
modelling structure. One immediate consequence of this conclusion is that
questions of the epistemic status of FEP models, their empirical content, the
predictions they do or do not make, and their precise relation to various corol-
lary models and process theories will have to be assessed piecemeal, for each
FEP model in its own right. This seems to pass the explanatory buck. In this
respect, the state of the FEP mirrors the state of the modelling literature at
large: there is very little that can be said evaluatively of models as an undiffer-
entiated whole. There are, though, broad-brushstrokes appraisals to be made of
the sorts of models that emerge from the FEP. Following this, there are more ex-
acting claims to be made about specific instantiations of the framework. These,
however, will have to be the subject of a later paper.
Another, more positive consequence, however, is that, having separated the
formal essence of the FEP from various interpretations thereof, we are now
free to build theoretical or empirical models with it without worrying about its
theoretical commitments or empirical support, for it has none. The only barrier
to utilising the FEP is understanding the maths and understanding how to relate
it to an open question or target system of interest. We did not enquire as to the
theoretical commitments or empirical support of the evolutionary algorithm or
Conway’s game of life; we simply played with them. Our approach to the FEP
ought to be the same.
That no silver bullet will vanquish—or vindicate—the spectre of the FEP
once and for all may come as a disappointment to some. Have all our at-
tempts to nail it down been in vain? I, for one, think not. It is my sincere
hope that one positive result of this exercise will have been to disabuse a few
scholars of outmoded conceptions of the scientific method. Scientists are not
everywhere all the time dealing in literally true direct representations of natural
systems. Arguably, much of what we are doing as scientists—especially now,
especially in the younger disciplines—is far more heuristic and bottom-up than
the theory-driven, hypothetico-deductive, falsificationist frames of yore would
have us believe.
It is perhaps natural—at least not uncommon—to think that without hard
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and universal desiderata for what differentiates scientific pursuits from other
intellectual projects, for what separates good and bad science, that we will slip
into everything-goes relativism or pluralism. An effort is only scientific, and
hence, worthwhile, if it makes concrete, falsifiable predictions. If we adopt this
frame, most of today’s scientific methods are not scientific at all. In fact, many
of our historical bastions of the scientific method have failed to live up to these
rigorous standards. It should not be considered a failing, however, that Galileo,
Newton, and Darwin’s work failed to be paradigmatic, failed to be theory-
driven, failed to uncover mechanisms, or failed to conform to a hypothetico-
deductive model. Model-based philosophy of science embraces the messiness
and pluralism of scientific practice. It has, at times, done so at the cost of
being overly-permissive. Pluralism as a thesis, however, does not absolve us of
the responsibility of distinguishing good and bad science, working methodologies
from those that have become enmired. That we cannot dismiss the FEP outright
for failing to put forth a testable hypothesis—or accept it because it purports
to explain a great many things—should not cause us to throw our hands in the
air. It should be, rather, a call to arms, an impetus to get ever more exacting.
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